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Letter dated 17 February 2004 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I write with reference to my letter of 3 November 2003 (S/2003/1063). The Counter-Terrorism Committee has received the attached fourth report from Singapore submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) (see annex). I would be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Inocencio F. **Arias**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

04-24793 (E) 310304

Annex

Letter dated 17 February 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee

Please refer to your letter dated 22 October 2003, which requested a fourth report from the Singapore Government pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). On 22 January 2004, I wrote to you to explain the reason for the delay in the submission of our report.

We have just received the report, which I am pleased to submit to you and to the Committee (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Kishore **Mahbubani**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Enclosure*

SINGAPORE'S RESPONSE TO THE QUERIES RAISED BY THE COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE (CTC) REGARDING SINGAPORE'S THIRD REPORT TO THE CTC

The CTC considers the following as priority areas in the implementation of resolution 1373 by Singapore:

- Effectiveness in the protection of the financial system; and
- Effectiveness of customs, immigrations and border controls.

In this context, the CTC, in the first letter to Singapore on Stage B matters, will focus on those aspects of the Resolution while others will be addressed in further letters. Singapore's response to the questions raised by the CTC in its letter of 22 Oct 20003 are as follows:

1. Implementation measures

Effectiveness in the protection of the financial system

Subparagraph 1.1:

- **The CTC would be grateful to be provided with an outline of the relevant provisions of The Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act 2003 which give effect to articles 2, 5 and 18 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.**

Singapore's response

Sections 3 to 6 of Singapore's The Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act comprehensively cover the scope of criminal activities set out in Article 2 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

* Annexes are on file with the Secretariat and are available for consultations.

Section 3 of the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act provides that it is an offence for any person to provide or collect property for a terrorist act, section 4 provides that it is an offence for any person to provide or collect property for a terrorist purpose, section 5 provides that it is an offence for any person to use or possess property for terrorist purposes, and section 6 provides that it is an offence to deal with terrorist property.

To ensure that the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act is consistent with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 'property' is defined in the Terrorism Act to cover the same scope of subject matter as "funds" in the Convention. Similarly, the scope of "terrorist act" in the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act is also based on Articles 2(1)(a)-(b) of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

Section 35 of the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act, which gives effect to Article 5 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, provides that if a body corporate commits an offence under the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act, the "director, manager, secretary or other similar officer or partner of the company, firm, society, [etc]" shall be guilty of that offence unless that person can show that the offence was committed without his consent or connivance, and that he had exercised due diligence.

Singapore has implemented many of the suggested measures in Article 18, even prior to the enactment of the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act. For example, money-transmission agencies are regulated under the Money-Changing and Remittance Businesses Act (Chapter 187). Other aspects of Article 18 have already been given effect by the Banking Act, the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations. These have also been discussed in Singapore's previous reports dated 21 December 2001 and 20 June 2002.

Subparagraph 1.2:

- **Effective implementation of sub-paragraph 1 (a) requires States to have in place effective executive machinery for preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorist acts. In this context the CTC would appreciate learning whether the Commercial Affairs Department has sufficient resources (human,**

financial and technical) to enable it to carry out its mandate. Please provide appropriate data in support of your response.

Singapore's response

In the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD), the Financial Investigation Branch (FIB) is tasked to and has adequate resources to perform terrorism financing investigations. FIB officers are trained at the graduate level in the fields of accountancy and other relevant disciplines. They are divided into two teams led by Head FIB, who himself is an experienced graduate officer. Both teams perform terrorism financing and money laundering investigations. Funding for the FIB comes under the overall CAD budget. FIB has access to a broad range of information sources to enable it to undertake investigations into terrorism financing offences. Such information sources include Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) information and relevant links to associated entities, criminal records, information on current investigations, household screenings, employment records, company records, bankruptcy and marriage records, vehicles, property, shares and security holdings.

Subparagraph 1.3:

- **The effective implementation of sub-paragraph 1 (a) requires States to have in place effective executive machinery for the prevention and the suppression of the financing of terrorist acts. In this regard, does Singapore provide training to its administrative, investigative, prosecutorial and judicial authorities aimed at enforcing its laws in relation to typologies and trends to counter terrorist financing methods and techniques? In the same context, does Singapore train the said authorities in techniques for tracing property, which represents the proceeds of crime or is to be used to finance terrorism? Please outline relevant programs or/and courses. What mechanisms/programs has Singapore in place to educate its different economic sectors as to how to detect suspicious and unusual transactions related to terrorist activities and as to how to prevent the movement of illicit money?**

Judicial education in the Singapore judiciary plays two key roles. First, it ensures that all Judges, Judicial Commissioners and registrars in the Supreme Court, and all district judges and magistrates in the Subordinate Courts are inculcated with the necessary skills and tools to carry out their core responsibilities proficiently in the adjudication of cases and administration of justice. Secondly, it

seeks to build up a forward-looking judiciary, which keeps abreast of the developments in the social, political and economic landscape in which it serves.

The judicial education programme is classified into five core areas, namely, bench skills, legal knowledge, social context education, judicial administration and ethics and conduct.

The judiciary must keep up with the latest developments, not only in the law, but also in new areas, which have an impact on the evolving nature of the law, such as the latest trends in crime, in particular, cross-border crimes and, technology.

The Subordinate Courts of Singapore takes a serious view of terrorism and adopts a pro-active approach to prepare the Subordinate Courts Judges to deal with terrorism related cases.

The Subordinate Courts have a Specialised Commercial, Civil and Criminal Courts Cluster headed personally by the Senior District Judge to deal with, inter alia, specialised offences such as financial fraud, money laundering, and computer crime. The Judges in this cluster are specially selected from amongst the best Judicial Officers in the Subordinate Courts. Most of them, including the Senior District Judge, have Masters Degrees in Law and other disciplines. Any cases in the Subordinate Courts involving terrorist financing would be dealt with by this Cluster. Some of the Judges also have extensive experience prosecuting complex financial fraud and cybercrime offences before their appointment to the Subordinate Courts Bench.

In addition, the Subordinate Courts also have in place a comprehensive continuing judicial education programme designed to keep the Judges of the Subordinate Courts abreast of changes in the law and the latest crime and other trends. In the year 2003 alone, at least 2 seminars were presented for Judges on related topics, including the Current And Emerging Threat Of Suicide Terrorism and Tackling Cybercrime. As part of this programme, officers from the Monetary Authority of Singapore, Singapore Exchange and other regulatory agencies are also invited, from time to time, to update the Judicial Officers on the latest trends and thinking in their fields. Our Judges also attend closed-door sessions on terrorism when available. Efforts such as these keep the Judges of the Subordinate Courts attuned to the threat of terrorist financing activities.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) emphasises training to upgrade and sharpen the supervisory and inspection skills of its staff. MAS conducts in-house training on anti-money money laundering and counter-terrorist financing where emerging trends and typologies are discussed. Guest speakers from the law enforcement authorities are also invited to present on relevant subjects such as Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) risks from the law enforcement perspective. MAS also sends its officers to participate in mutual evaluation missions organised by the Financial Action Task Force and the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering as a form of training as well. MAS officers regularly attend international conferences/workshops on AML/CFT matters, for example, the Financial Action Task Force and Asia Pacific Group Typologies Workshop. They also attend seminars/workshops on AML/CFT organised by industry bodies and training institutions, such as the Association of Banks in Singapore and the IMF-Singapore Regional Training Institute.

Commercial Affairs Department (CAD)

Officers from the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) receive domestic and international training on terrorism financing typologies through attendance at annual Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) Typologies Workshops. In addition, officers are sent for conferences and workshops organised by various international organisations where typologies of terrorism financing are discussed. Suitable officers are identified to attend specialised courses on asset tracing conducted by overseas investigative agencies. In addition, on-the-job training and working under an experienced team leader gives officers guidance and direction, especially with regards to investigation techniques and processes that are utilised for funds flow tracing. Continuous training is addressed through a yearly learning needs analysis where individual officers identify specific areas in which they would like to build more expertise.

CAD has embarked on a public education program with certain financial sectors including banks, insurance companies and moneychangers/remitters to share STR typologies and "red flags" for detection of STRs. For this purpose, CAD has organised a workshop on Money Laundering and TF and - conducted a similar

workshop with the public accountants in November 2003. A similar outreach to the legal sector is being planned in April 2004.

Singapore's Prosecutorial Authorities

Singapore's prosecutorial authorities conduct regular in-house training sessions on the laws relating to countering terrorist financing as well as the relevant laws and procedures on confiscation. Manuals detailing the procedures for enforcing the relevant laws have been prepared to ensure a consistent approach. Legal officers and paralegals are also trained to prepare court documents for restraint orders, production orders and forfeiture orders. In addition, legal officers attend local as well as international meetings and conferences relating to financing of terrorism offences. They also participate regularly in the training sessions conducted by the investigative authorities.

Singapore Customs

Singapore Customs conducts regular outreach sessions to educate industries on Singapore's strategic goods control system. Participants are also reminded on the need to exercise due diligence, particularly with regards to goods originating from the countries and entities that are listed in the lists compiled under the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and the unilateral lists of the United States and the European Union.

Subparagraph 1.4:

- **With reference to the effective implementation of sub-paragraph 1 (a) of the Resolution the CTC would be grateful to know whether legal obligations have been imposed on lawyers and other professionals to report suspicious financial transactions to the relevant authorities? Are the relevant Singaporean authorities competent to share information, relating to suspicious transactions, with other States if the information in question relates to suspected money laundering or to the financing of terrorism in other States?**

Singapore's response

Under Section 39 of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act ("CDSA"), all persons are obligated to make a

Suspicious Transactions Report (STR) if that person has reason to suspect that any property is linked to, or represents the proceeds of, criminal activity, and that suspicion arose in the course of his business or employment. This obligation to make a STR is wide enough to cover not just lawyers, accountants and other professionals, but all persons. The only statutory exception to this obligation is under section 39(4) of the CDSA, if the information in question is subject to legal privilege. However, legal privilege is not absolute. Section 128 of the Evidence Act provides that the following professional communications between an advocate or solicitor and his client are not subject to legal privilege:

- *any communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose;*

- *any fact observed by any advocate or solicitor in the course of his employment as such showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his employment.*

Apart from the above, rule 22 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules also provides that an advocate or solicitor may not give any legal advice for an illegal purpose.

The Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office (STRO) is able to exchange STR information with its foreign counterparts under Section 41 of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act.

Subparagraph 1.5:

- **Sub-paragraph 1 (a) of the Resolution requires financial institutions and other intermediaries to identify their clients and to report suspicious financial transactions to the relevant authorities. In this regard would Singapore please provide the CTC with the number of suspicious transactions reports (STR) received by the competent authorities, with particular regard to STRs from:**

- **off-shore banks;**
- **bureaux de change;**
- **money remittance/transfer services**

Please also indicate the number of STRs analysed and disseminated as well as the number of STRs which have led to investigations, prosecutions or convictions.

Singapore's response

The information requested by the CTC is provided at ***Annex A****. We are unable to provide a figure for the STRs submitted specifically by offshore banks. The figure provided is for all banks. Also, money changers and remittance businesses are treated as one category under our computerised system.*

Subparagraph 1.6:

- **As regards the implementations of sub-paragraphs 1 (a) and (d), could Singapore please provide the CTC with statistics on the number of cases where sanctions for providing support to terrorists or terrorist organisations were imposed on financial and non-financial institutions. Do Singapore's authorities audit financial institutions to verify compliance with requirements to submit suspicious transactions reports? Are bureaux de exchange and remittance agencies routinely audited? How often are financial institutions subject to such audits? What other specific measures have Singapore authorities taken to identify, measure and regulate any informal banking flows that occur outside the official regulated system?**

Singapore's response

To date, financial institutions in Singapore have not found any transactions or assets belonging to terrorists or terrorist organizations identified by the United Nations Security Council.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) conducts inspections regularly to assess the adequacy of financial institutions', procedures[1] for identifying and reporting Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs). At the conclusion of an inspection, a report is drawn up and MAS will take follow-up action with the institution concerned on the steps to be taken to correct any shortcomings or deficiencies. MAS examiners also assess staff awareness and vigilance in Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism and training received.

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1 Including bureaux de change and remittance agencies.

In addition to the MAS' own inspections, under the Money-Changing and Remittance Business Act (MCRBA) and licensing conditions, MAS requires independent external auditors to audit annually, among other things, bureaux de change and remittance agencies, for compliance with MAS Notices and the applicable laws[2]*. Bureaux de change and remittance agencies are also required to furnish their annual audited reports to MAS.*

**The Corruption Drug Trafficking and Serious Offences Act (CDSA) (Section 39(1)) imposes the mandatory obligation for all persons, including financial institutions to file a STR if he has reasonable grounds to suspect that property is linked to criminal activity, and such suspicion arose in the course of employment or business. The Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act also provides for a duty to disclose any information about any transaction or proposed transaction in respect of any property belonging to any terrorist or terrorist entity. To complement the CDSA, the MAS has also issued anti-money laundering guidelines as contained in the MAS Notices on the Prevention of Money Laundering (MAS Notices). The MAS Notices state that each financial institution shall institute a system for reporting suspicious transactions under the CDSA.*

Subparagraph 1.7:

- **The provisions of the UNSCR 1373 apply to all terrorists, not only those included in the UNSCR 1267 list. How do legal provisions and administrative procedures in Singapore ensure the implementation of the requirements of sub-paragraphs 1 (a) and (d) of the Resolution with regard to any individuals or entities that are not included in the UNSCR 1267 list? In particular the CTC is interested in the procedure used to proscribe foreign terrorist organisations (other than those listed by the Security Council), if any, as well as data as regards the number of organisations involved and/or corresponding examples. How long does it take to prescribe a terrorist organisation at the request of another State or based on information supplied by another State? In the absence of the relevant mechanism please outline steps Singapore intends taking to meet in full those aspects of the Resolution.**

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[2] It is an offence under the MCRBA for any person to conduct remittance or money-changing business without a valid licence. Persons conducting illegal remittance or money-changing business would be referred to CAD for investigation. CAD investigates all illegal remittance or money-changing activities. The penalty for conducting illegal remittance or money-changing business is a fine not exceeding S$50,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or to both.

Singapore's response

Singapore's counter-terrorism laws apply to all persons, whether or not they have been included in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 ("Resolution 1267 (1999)") list.

The implementation of sub-paragraphs 1(a) and 1(d) of Resolution 1373 (2001) is effected by the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act which is discussed above, and section 27A of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act (MAS Act) which has been described in detail in Singapore's 2nd report to the CTC dated 20 June 2002 (paragraphs 3 to 7).

The directions issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore to financial institutions to freeze accounts and assets would cover persons and entities that are listed, pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1390 (2002), by the Sanctions Committee established under Resolution 1267 (1999). However, if a country has information about terrorists or terrorist assets in Singapore, it can forward the information to the Singapore authorities for investigation. Singapore will deal firmly with any person involved in the financing or support of terrorism, including the freezing of assets and any other necessary action under the relevant laws.

Effectiveness of customs, immigration and border control

Subparagraph 1.8:

- **Implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Resolution requires the operation of effective customs and border controls with a view to preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorist activities. Does Singapore impose controls on the cross-border movement of cash, negotiable instruments, precious stones and metals (for example, by imposing an obligation to make a declaration or to obtain prior authorisation before any such movements take place)? Please provide information concerning any relevant monetary or financial thresholds.**

Singapore does not impose controls on cross-border movement of cash or financial instruments. However, customs officers would need to make Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) under the Section 39(1) of the CDSA as laid out in the

footnote on S39(1) of CDSA in Subparagraph 1.6 above. Any import or export of goods would require an import and export permit declaration.

Cash reporting requirement at the borders may be limited in its effectiveness as launderers and terrorists are unlikely to declare their cash holdings at the border. From the efficiency standpoint, the number of cash transaction reports resulting from such a system generates excessive unproductive reports that tie down the resources of various agencies, in particular the Financial Intelligence Unit, which can be better deployed elsewhere. It is far more effective to put safeguards around our financial system and restrict access to it through vigilant application of anti-money laundering regulations and the reporting of transactions that are truly suspicious.

Subparagraph 1.9:

- **In regard to preventing the movement of terrorists please outline legal and administrative procedures developed by Singapore to protect the port facility and ships, persons, cargo, cargo transport units, off-shore installations and ship's stores from the risks of a terrorist attacks. Please outline any procedures adopted in Singapore for controlling access to the ship; monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorised persons have access; supervising the handling of cargo and ship stores. Do Singaporean competent authorities put procedures in place for the periodic review of transport security plans with a view to keeping them up-to-date? If yes, please outline.**

Singapore's response

Maritime security is a vital component of Singapore's national security. The security measures in the Singapore Strait and territorial waters have been constantly reviewed and enhanced. The maritime security agencies, in particular the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), the Police Coast Guard (PCG), the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) and the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) are ready and vigilant, working in close co-ordination with one another to protect Singapore against sea-borne threats.

Singapore is also working towards the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code approved by IMO in December 2002. The Code is a new comprehensive security regime that seeks to establish an international framework of co-operation between governments, government agencies and the

shipping and port industries in order to detect and take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade. To give effect to the ISPS Code which will come into force internationally on 1 July 2004, MPA is amending its Merchant Shipping (Safety Convention) Regulations, 1999 and MPA (Port) Regulations, 1997. Owners and operators of Singapore port facilities, as well as shipowners of Singapore and foreign ships, are required under the ISPS Code to conduct security assessments, develop security plans, train security officers, and conduct regular drills and exercises for their port facilities and ships.

Other port and ship security measures that have been implemented by Singapore are as follows:

- *Certain sensitive areas such as the waters around chemical and offshore oil terminals have been declared as prohibited areas. Vessels and craft are not allowed to enter, anchor, moor or transit these prohibited areas without the prior approval of the relevant authority;*

- *Routes for ferries, trade craft and pleasure craft entering and leaving the port have been diverted away from the sensitive installations such as petrochemical terminals;*

- *The Singapore Vessel Traffic Information System also closely monitors the movements of sensitive vessels including LPG, LNG, chemical tankers, passenger ships and oil tankers;*

- *The security at sea entry checkpoints has been tightened to prevent entry of undesirable persons and dangerous weapons. Ships' crew and passengers from vessels at anchorages and offshore terminals can land only at two designated landing points (West Coast Pier and Clifford Pier) where customs, immigration and quarantine (CIQ) facilities are deployed. They are subjected to "face-to-face" checks by the relevant authority at these designated landing points;*

- *Ships on arrival and before departure have to anchor at designated Immigration Anchorages where "face-to-face" checks of crewmembers are conducted by the relevant authority;*

- *Security checks on passengers and luggage with the use of X-ray machines, walk-through and metal detectors have been implemented at cruise and ferry terminals;*

- *Surveillance of port waters has been stepped up with the increased presence of patrol craft and monitoring using radar; and*

- *Singapore enforcement agencies conduct routine patrols along the Singapore Strait, including random escort operations for high value merchant vessels. Security measures have also been enhanced to protect stationary vessels along the Strait and in Singapore territorial waters. Maritime security procedures and systems are regularly tested out during exercises.*

With regard to the security of cargo, in particular container cargo, Singapore's framework for container security requires that all containers entering Singapore enter through designated free trade zones (FTZs), where proper security measures are in place. Documentary oversight of all containers is exercised. Risk profiling is carried out based on advance cargo information, and identified high-risk containers are set aside and scanned for illicit material. Singapore implemented the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in partnership with the USA in March 2003, under which containers destined for the USA are targeted by US Customs officials stationed within the port of Singapore for scanning. Risk profiling has been aided by recent US enforcement of its 24-hour Manifest Rule, which mandates that all carriers submit full cargo manifests 24 hours before cargo bound for the USA is loaded onto the vessel in Singapore.

Subparagraph 1.10:

- **Sub-Paragraph 2 (b) requires States to take the necessary measures to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. In that regard, could Singapore please explain how it determines the beneficial ownerships of ships registered under it, as a "Flag State", and how it compares its lists of 'known or suspected terrorists with the names of the beneficial owners of these vessels with a view to detecting terrorist involvement?**

Singapore's response

The Singapore Registry of Ships (SRS) requires the owner to incorporate a company in Singapore who for all intents and purposes will own the vessel. The company will also have to have a paid-up capital of at least 10% of the value of the first ship registered, with a minimum amount of S$50,000. The shareholders of the company will have to be declared.

Subparagraph 1.11:

- **The CTC would be interested in learning how the Singaporean Customs Authorities, and other relevant bodies, deal with problems of deception, such as the under-invoicing of imports and the over-invoicing of exports bearing in mind that such methods can be used to divert resources to support terrorism in Singapore and throughout the world.**

Singapore's response

Wrong invoicing for the purpose of import/export permit declaration is an offence under Singapore's laws. The penalties for wrong invoicing are: fines not exceeding $10,000 or the equivalent of the exact amount of customs duty, excise duty or tax payable, whichever is the greater, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to both.

Subparagraph 1.12:

- **The CTC would be pleased to receive an outline of Singapore's legal provisions governing the granting of citizenship to foreigners. Is a foreigner, who has been granted citizenship rights in Singapore, allowed to change his or her name? How does Singapore establish a person's true identity, before authorising such a change in name?**

Singapore's response

Part X of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore governs the granting of citizenship to foreigners. The relevant articles are as follows:

Article 121 - Citizenship by birth;
Article 122 - Citizenship by descent;

Article 123 - Citizenship by registration; and
Article 124 - Registration for minors.

For more details on the above articles, please refer to ***Annex B***

Regulation 10(1)(a) of the National Registration Regulations (NRR) requires that an IC holder (who is either a Singapore Citizen or Singapore Permanent Resident) who changes his/her name shall within 28 days report the fact to the nearest registration office and apply for a replacement IC with the correct particulars. Any amendment to the registered name must be substantiated with a Deed Poll and for the insertion of religious or married names, the relevant religious certificates and marriage certificate must be produced.

For authentication purposes, all foreigners granted Singapore citizenship are required to register for a Singapore citizen identity card (IC) under the NRR and have their fingerprints captured at the time of registration. If the holder changes his/her name, he/she would need to apply for a new IC. Authentication through fingerprint matching would be carried out prior to the issuance of the replacement IC reflecting the new name.

Subparagraph 1.13:

- **The CTC would be interested in learning whether Singapore's laws permit the transmission of advance information, pertaining to passengers and cargo, to the relevant Singapore's authorities with a view to enabling those authorities to screen cargo and passengers before disembarkation. Similarly, the CTC would be interested in hearing whether Singapore's laws allow for the transmission of advance information, pertaining to cargo and passengers, to the authorities of other States with a view to enabling those other States to screen passengers and cargo before disembarkation?**

Singapore's response

Import declarations have to be made in advance for all imports of goods into Singapore. The export and transhipment of controlled goods are also required to be declared in advance. These advance declarations are made under the Regulation of Imports & Exports Act and the Customs Act. The declarations are all made electronically through the TradeNet system. The electronic declarations allow

Singapore Customs to conduct risk profiling of the cargoes through which high-risk cargoes are selected for targeted checks.

Advance information on goods can be shared with relevant Singapore authorities for the investigation of offences under the Regulation of Imports & Exports Act and the Customs Act. The sharing of information pertaining to passengers with other States is allowed. Singapore may do so as part of our counter-terrorism efforts.

Subparagraph 1.14:

- **Has Singapore implemented, using risk assessment principles, any special security measures on the import, export and transit movement of firearms, such as conducting security checks on the temporary storage, warehouses and means of transport carrying firearms, and requiring personnel involved in these operations to undergo security vetting? If yes, please give details.**

Singapore's response

Singapore controls the export, re-export and transhipment of firearms and has also put in place legislation (Arms Offences Act, Arms & Explosives Act), which regulates the manufacture, possession and transfer of firearms, to prevent these items from being diverted for illicit purposes.

Most of the firearms imported into Singapore are for government departments who have proper secured and approved armouries. Private shooting clubs also have secured armouries with proper security features. Those arms that are due to be transhipped are bonded at the FTZ.

Singapore is the first Asian country to sign the Declaration of Principles for the Container Security Initiative (CSI) with United States on 20 Sep 2002. Under the CSI, containers destined for US ports may be selected for checks in the Singapore ports using the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) for WMDs. The CSI screening has since commenced on 17 Mar 2003.

Subparagraph 1.15:

- **Is it necessary to lodge and register or check off the Goods declaration and supporting documents relating to firearms prior to the import, export or**

transit movement of the goods as well as encourage importers, exporters or third parties to provide information to Customs prior to their shipment? Please outline also any appropriate mechanism to verify the authenticity of licensing or authorisation documents for the import, export or transit movements of firearms?

Singapore's response

For all imports, exports and transhipments, checks are conducted on relevant documents such as the end user certificates, bills of lading, invoices and import licences issued by the competent authority of the final destination country. Where some doubt exists over the accuracy or authenticity of any of these documents, such documents will be verified with the assistance of the diplomatic mission of the final destination country.

Subparagraph 1.16:

- **Has Singapore's Customs Service implemented intelligence-based risk management on border to identify high-risk goods? Please outline data elements required by Customs Administration to identify high-risk consignment prior to shipment**

Singapore's response

The Immigrations and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) ensures that the movement of people, goods and conveyances through Singapore's checkpoints is legitimate and lawful. In addition, Singapore Customs has implemented an intelligence-based risk management framework to target high-risk goods that are subjected to controls. The risk elements will depend on factors such as the destination/origin of the goods, the nature of the goods and the compliance record of the shipper.

Subparagraph 1.17:

- **The CTC is aware that Singapore may have covered some or all of the points in the preceding paragraphs in reports or questionnaires submitted to other organisations involved in monitoring international standards. The CTC would be content to receive a copy of any such report or questionnaire as part of Singapore's response to these matters as well as details of efforts to implement international best practice, codes and standards which are relevant to the implementation of resolution 1373.**

Singapore's response

The responses to the preceding questions are sufficiently detailed.

2. Assistance and guidance

Subparagraph 2.1:

• The CTC wishes to emphasise once more the importance, which it attaches to the provision of assistance and advice in connection with the implementation of Resolution 1373. The Committee is therefore anxious to maintain and develop the constructive dialogue, which it is already engaged in with Singapore in relation to this priority area.

Singapore's response

Singapore shares the Committee's view on the need to maintain and develop the existing dialogue. Like the CTC, Singapore also regards this as a priority area.

Subparagraph 2.2:

• Further, as regards Singapore's need for assistance in the area of ratification and implementation of the 12 International Conventions and Protocols relating to terrorism and strengthening its capacity against terrorism, the CTC would point out that the Government of Singapore may request technical assistance directly from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Terrorism Prevention Branch under its Global Programme Against Terrorism. In particular, such assistance may include the drafting of legislation relating to counter terrorism, including the review of legislation in place for compliance with Resolution 1373 and the provisions of the 12 International Conventions and Protocol. The Government of Singapore may take advantage of the benefits of this programme by writing to the UNODC, by e-mail, or by fax, requesting technical assistance addressed to:

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Terrorism Prevention Branch
Room E1282-Vienna International Centre
P.O.Box 500
A-1400-Vienna

Contact person:
Mr.Jean-Paul Laborde
Chief, Terrorism Prevention Branch
Tel:+431260604207
Fax:+431260605898
E-mail: jean-paul.laborde@unodc.org
Or cicp.tpb@unodc.org

Subparagraph 2.3:

- **In that context, the Committee would be pleased to hear whether there are areas in which further assistance or advice might prove beneficial to Singapore in the steps which it is taking to implement the Resolution. The CTC would also appreciate receiving information from Singapore concerning areas where it might be in a position to provide assistance to other States in relation to the implementation of the Resolution.**

Singapore's response

Singapore appreciates the offer of assistance in the area of ratification and implementation of International Conventions and Protocols relating to terrorism and strengthening our capacity against terrorism. Singapore will avail itself of such assistance as and when it is deemed necessary.